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RESIDENCE IS ALTERNATIVE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
TO DOMICILE IN SERVICEMAN'S DIVORCE ACTION
Plaintiff, an Air Force officer stationed in Alaska, commenced action
for divorce under the provisions of an Alaska statute' which extends
divorce jurisdiction to military personnel who have resided within the
state for one year. Defendant, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, made a
general appearance by attorney and contested the court's jurisdiction
to grant the decree, alleging that plaintiff was not an Alaska domiciliary. The lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed. Held: An
Alaska court has jurisdiction to grant divorces to military personnel
who have resided in the state for one year even though they may not be
Alaska domiciliaries. Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 293 P.2d 24 (Alaska,
1964).
The traditional view of American courts has been that domicile of
one party to a divorce proceeding is prerequisite for jurisdiction to
affect the status of marriage,2 and that a person can have only one
domicile for any one purpose.' This rule is based, in part, upon the
view of many state courts that a divorce action, insofar as it affects
status, is an in rem proceeding in which the res, the marital status, is
located only at the domicile of either party.' The domicile requirement,
' ALASKA STAT. 09.55.160 (1962). "A person serving in a military branch of the
United States government who has been continuously stationed in a military base or
installation in the state for a period of one year shall be deemed a resident in good faith
of the state for the purposes of § 70-230 of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) American
courts almost invariably construe "residence" as used in statutes prescribing a court's
jurisdiction to grant divorce decrees to mean "domicile." See Reese and Green, That
Elsive Word Residence, 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953). This rule of interpretation is
noted in the RESTATEMENT (SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9, comment j (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954).
"A state lacks judicial jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is
domiciled within the state." RESTATEMENT op. cit. supra note 1, § 111 (Tent. Draft
No. 1 (1953); but see, § lla; GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127 (4th ed. 1964).
When dealing with divorce, courts are concerned with "domicile of choice." See
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-50 (3rd ed. 1963). A widely adopted definition is
that of Mr. Justice Story: "That is properly the domicile of a man where he has his
true, fixed permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning." (Emphasis added.) STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 41 (8th ed. 1883). Theoretically, all that is necessary to change one's domicile
is a concurrence of physical presence and the requisite intent to make one's home at
that place. RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supranote 1, § 15.
8 LELA , CoNmIcr OF LAWS 15 and § 15 (1959); RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 11; but see COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASrS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
ch. VII and ch. XVII, at 446-47 (1942).
4 See generally, EHRENZWEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 76 (1962); Rheinstein, The
Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction,22 U. CHI. L. Ray. 775 (1955); Sumner, Full
Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, Q
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1955).
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coupled with the in rem conception of divorce proceedings, has provided
a method by which courts can render valid ex parte divorce decrees
against defendants not otherwise within the courts' jurisdiction. Proponents of the domicile requirement contend that it serves to restrict
divorce jurisdiction to the states which have the greatest interest in the
parties' marital status,5 and that it restrains attempts to circumvent the
divorce policies of the domiciliary states. Functionally, domicile has
provided a generally accepted standard which limits the jurisdiction a
state may claim under the aegis of the full faith and credit clause,
thereby accommodating the individual states' jurisdictional powers over

divorce proceedings.'
Unfortunately, a literal application of the domicile requirement often
denies military personnel access to divorce forums in states in which
they are stationed. The general rule is that military personnel continue
to be domiciled in the state of their domicile at the time of entry into
military service.' This is partly a rule of practicality, but primarily it
is a conclusion of law which follows from the emphasis placed upon
subjective intent in the historic definition of domicile. Because military
personnel are subject to orders and frequent relocation they are not
free to exercise their "intentions" by choosing a permanent home. As
a result, they cannot establish a new domicile in states in which they
are stationed, and are usually unable to meet the jurisdictional requirements for commencing divorce proceedings in those states.' Alaska is
not the first state to enact a divorce statute which eliminates the domicile requirement for the benefit of military personnel One state has
5Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,298 (1942).
aRheinstein, supra note 4, at 781; LErx.z,op. cit. supra note 3, § 9.
7 "A person cannot acquire a domicile of choice by any act done under a legal or
physical compulsion." RESTATEMT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 21. Comment d specifically
applies
this rule to military personnel.
8
E.g., Clark v. Clark, 71 Ariz. 194, 225 P.2d 486 (1950) ; Pendleton v. Pendleton,
109 Kan. 600, 201 Pac. 62 (1921). The latter case suggests the difficulty in establishing
domicile that might be encountered by a serviceman whose family had been in the armed
services for several generations. In many states a divergent line of cases find domicile,
and allow maintenance of divorce proceedings by military personnel who live off base
and can adduce objective proof of intent to attain domicile. See Annot. 21 A.L.R.2d
1163, §§ 7-11 (1952).
9FLA. STAT. ANN. § 46.12 (Supp. 1964) was upheld in Mills v. Mills, 153 Fla. 746,
15 So2d 763 (1943). KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1502 (1949) was the first state
legislation of this nature. It was upheld in Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464
(1936). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-74 (1954) was upheld in Crownover v. Crownover, 58
N.M. 597, 274 P2d 127 (1954), and Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020
(1958). Tnx. Rnv. STAT. ANN. art 4631 (1960) was upheld in Wood v. Wood, 159
Tex. 350, 320 S.W2d 807 (1959). Ar.A. CODF, tit. 7, § 96 (1) (1960) was upheld in
Conrad v. Conrad, 275 AxL. 202, 153 So.2d 635 (1963). At least four other states have
statutes similar to Alaska's which have not to date been questioned in the courts: Ky.
Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 403.035 (1) (1962); O..A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (1961);
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 42-303 (1960) ; VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-97 (1960), discussed in 44 VA.
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gone so far as to enact a statute of general application which bases
divorce jurisdiction upon three-months' residence.10 There are other
variations from the domicile requirement."
Alaska's attempt to provide a divorce forum for military personnel
stationed within the state raises two constitutional questions: First, are
decrees awarded under a statute which substitutes residence for domicile as the jurisdictional standard in divorce actions entitled to full faith
and credit recognition in other jurisdictions? Second, does a statute
which dispenses with the requirement of domicile violate due process of
law?' 2
The United States Supreme Court has never expressly ruled that
domicile is a constitutional requirement which must be met before full
faith and credit need be given to a divorce decree granted by another
state. The Court has, however, stated that "courts of one state are...
without jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages of those domiciled in
other states."' In Williams v. North Carolina (Williams (II)),"- the
L. REv. 1192 (1958). One state court interpreted a similar statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-18 (Supp. 1963), as not having changed the domicile requirement. Martin v.
Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961). The case is criticized in 40 N.C. L. REv.
343 (1962). Another court has declared a similar statute unconstitutional insofar as it
conflicts with the venue requirements of the state constitution. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-107

(Supp. 1963), Darbie v. Darbie, 195 Ga. 769, 25 S.E.2d 685 (1943). Some states have
expressed their concern for their domiciliaries in the armed forces who are stationed in
other states by providing special divorce forums. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-15 (1958);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1203 (Supp. 1964); VT. STAT. tit 15, § 592 (1958); R-I. LAWS
ANN. § 15-5-12 (1956).
10ARK. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (1962). This statute was held to be constitutional in Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958). For a discussion of
the Arkansas statute by another court in which the statute was not at issue, see Commiskey v. Commiskey, 362 Minn. 676, 107 N.W.2d 864, 869 (1961).

11 See CoLo.

REV. STAT.

ANN. § 46-1-3 (1963)

(domicile not required if adultery or

extreme cruelty is alleged); LA. CiVIL CODE ANN. 139, 142 (Supp. 1964), but see LA.
C.C.P. 10 (7) (1960), and Thomas v. Thomas, 144 So.2d 612 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962),
discussed in 23 LA. L. REv. 600 (1962) ; ME. REv. STAT. ch. 166 § 55 (1959), Walker
v. Walker, 111 Me. 404, 89 Atl. 373, 374 (1914); Mo. REV. STAT., § 452.050 (1952)
(domicile not required where the offense or injury was committed within the state),
Madsen v. Madsen, 193 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1946), discussed in 24 Mo. L. REv. 218
(1959); MINK. STAT. § 518.07 (1947) (domicile not required if adultery is alleged);
N.Y. CivIL PRAcTIcE AcT § 1147-52 (1944) (divorce jurisdiction based solely upon the
fact of marriage within the state, regardless of present domicile), David Zieseness v.
Zieseness, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.YS2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
34-10 (1) (1952) (domicile not required if adultery is alleged), but see, Matias v.
Matias, 70 N.J. Super. 111, 175 A.2d 259 (1961).
12 A full exposition of the due process question is beyond the scope of this note, and
the discussion which follows is intended only to be suggestive of problems encountered
in the area.
1s Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) (dictum). The Durfee case was not a
divorce case. Rather, it involved an extension of the principle of res judicata to jurisdictional disputes over real property. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) and Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938), both of which
involved an application of res judicata principles to foreign divorce decrees. Mr. Justice
Stewart does not disclose what is meant by "dissolve." If "dissolve" includes annulments as well as divorces, a majority of states presently, by statute or judicial precedent, violate the domicile jurisdictional requirement by granting annulments in some
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Supreme Court established the rule that a divorce decree is subject to
collateral attack if it is based on an erroneous finding of domicile. In
cases following Wigiams (II), collateral attack on the issue of domicile
has been narrowed, and is now limited to ex parte divorce decrees.
In Sherrer v. Sherrer,5 the Supreme Court held that where both
parties to a divorce decree had participated 6 in the proceedings and

had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the domicile issue, the
divorce could not be collaterally attacked by the participants in the
courts of another state. This rule has since been extended to preclude
collateral attack by third parties 7 and to raise a presumption of participation." In the Sherrer line of cases a state court had refused to
give full faith and credit to a divorce decree granted in another state

after finding that neither of the parties to the divorce were domiciled
in the decree-granting state. The Supreme Court reversed these decisions, holding that the first state's determination of domicile was res

judicata and that full faith and credit recognition of the divorce decree
was mandatory. The effect of applying res judicata to extra-territorial
divorce decrees has been to empower participating parties to a divorce
to confer jurisdiction by consent, and to make actual proof of domicile
necessary only when an ex parte divorce decree has been collaterally
9
attacked.
A participating divorce decree granted under the Alaska statute
would present a fact situation very similar to those found in the Sherrer
line of cases."0 In both situations, the decree-granting state is not the
state of technical domicile, but, because the parties have participated
in the proceedings, the requirements of procedural due process would
seem satisfied"' and full faith and credit recognition should be required.
circumstances to non-domiciliaries. See Vernon, Labyrinthe Ways: Jurisdiction To
Annul, 10 J. PUB. L. 47 (1961). Statements of a similar nature have been made in
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349 (1948) ; Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325
U.S. 226, 229 (1945) ; Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317, U.S. 287, 297 (1942) ;
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 15, 41-42 (1903) ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 178 (1901).
14 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
15 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; accord, Coe v. Coe 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
16 For cases defining the degree of "participation" necessary, see EHRENZWEIG, op.
cit. supra note 4, § 74 (1962).
17
1 8 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (daughter).
Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
19
EHENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 4, at 242.
20
In Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P2d 127 (1954), and Wallace v.
Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958), the New Mexico Supreme Court, relying
on the Sherrer line of cases, upheld divorces granted under a statute very similar to
Alaska's.
" In Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963), the Supreme Court reviewed Sherrerand
other cases involving the application of res judicata to cases in which there is a jurisdictional dispute. The court did not mention due process. Apparently once the controversy has been "fully and fairly" litigated the requirements of due process are satisfied.
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Williams (II) seems to control cases involving ex parte decrees ren-

dered under the Alaska statute to servicemen technically domiciled in
other states. In such cases, a second state would not be precluded by
the Sherrer doctrine of res judicata from relitigating the jurisdictional
issue and denying full faith and credit recognition. In Williams (II),
an ex parte divorce decree had been granted under a Nevada statute
which required domicile.2 The Supreme Court held that North Carolina could deny full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce decree if the
North Carolina court, after placing the burden of proof on the challenging party, found the Nevada court's determination of domicile to
be erroneous. The Williams (II) decision does not make clear whether
full faith and credit was denied because domicile is a constitutional
requirement for jurisdiction to divorce, or because the Nevada divorce
statute requiring domicile for jurisdiction to divorce was not fulfilled."
If domicile is a constitutional requirement for divorce jurisdiction, as
Mr. Justice Stewart has indicated in Durfee v. Duke,24 any ex parte
decree rendered under the Alaska statute to a serviceman technically
domiciled in another state would be void and not entitled to full faith
and credit. If, on the other hand, full faith and credit was denied
because Nevada's divorce statute requiring domicile was not fulfilled,
then it appears that ex parte decrees granted under the Alaska statute
should be entitled to full faith and credit, because the Alaska statute
does not require domicile. Absent a definitive Supreme Court holding,
it is not certain whether full faith and credit must be given to ex parte
divorce decrees granted under the Alaska statute. It does seem, however, that if the Alaska legislature had defined domicile as "residence
within the state for one year" and incorporated this definition into the
divorce statutes, collateral attack on ex parte decrees by other state
courts might be precluded and the precedential force of Williams (II)
considerably curtailed.
In Alton v. Alton25 the Third Circuit held that a Virgin Islands statute which required only six weeks' residence for divorce jurisdiction
contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judge Goodrich, writing for the majority, reasoned that since the Su22 Nzv.

Rxv. STAT. § 125.020 (1957).
For an exhaustive discussion of the divergent views expressed in the opinion see
Powell, And Repent at Leisure: An Inquiry Into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom
Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 HARV. L.
REv. 930 (1945).
25

24375

U.S. 106, 115 (1963)

(dictum).

25 207 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911 (1954), dismissed as
moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). See 67 HARv. L. Rsv. 516 (1954).
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preme Court has denied full faith and credit recognition where divorce
jurisdiction was not based upon a finding of domicile," it must be
because the initial rendering of such decrees violates due process. There
is little authority for this conclusion, and it seems to be a unique and
strained application of the due process clause."7 Full faith and credit is
usually denied on jurisdictional grounds for the purpose of protecting
state and public interests in the marital status of the domiciliary state's
citizens, or assuring that one state does not attempt to extend its jurisdiction so far as to infringe upon the sovereignty of other states. The
jurisdictional demands of due process, on the other hand, are designed
to assure procedural fairness in determination of the rights of the
parties to the action. In Alton, the domiciliary state was not a party to
the divorce proceedings. Any failure to consider its interests should not
have been objectionable on due process grounds. Because the defendant in Alton consented to the court's jurisdiction by entering a general
appearance, none of his rights protected by the due process clause
appear to have been infringed or impaired.2 8 Where both parties have
consented to the court's jurisdiction and actively litigated the issues of
the divorce due process would seem to be satisfied. The Supreme Court
declined to rule on the due process question in Alton.29 Only one state
court has held that a statute which fails to base jurisdiction on domicile
is unconstitutional." Many authorities have been critical of the Third
Circuit's analysis," and a number of state courts have expressly rejected it. 2
2

11Williams

v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).

27 See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3rd Cir. 1953)

(dissenting opinion);
Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127, 134 (1954) (concurring opinion);
Stimson, Jurisdictionin Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory,
42 A.B.A.J. 222, 224-25 (1956) ; Rtheinstein, supra note 4, at 779. But see Stumberg,
Jurisdiction
to Divorce, 24 TEx. L. REV. 119, 123-24 (1946).
28
When the Virgin Islands statute reached the Supreme Court in a subsequent case
Mr. Justice Clark stated: "[N]either of the Granville-Smiths claim that they have
been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. While the state
has an interest in the marital relationship, certainly this interest does not come within
the protection of the Due Process clause." Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1955) (dissenting opinion). The court avoided the due process question
and held the statute invalid on the ground that the territorial legislature had exceeded
the2 power granted it by Congress in enacting the statute.
9 Certiorari was granted in the Alton case but it was later dismissed as moot since
one of the parties obtained a divorce in another state. See note 25 supra.
20 Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So2d 236 (1948), held invalid a statute permitting non-resident couples to confer jurisdiction by consent and thus obtain an Alabama divorce. The same court, however, in Conrad v. Conrad, 275 Ala. 202, 153 So.2d
635 (1963), held that an Alabama statute A.. CoDE tit. 7, § 96 (1) (1960), was valid
even though it extended divorce jurisdiction to military personnel without a finding of
domicile and, in the Conrad case, without meeting the prescribed one year residence
requirement.
s1 See authorities cited note 27 supra.
32 See cases cited notes 9 and 10 mipra.
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Policy considerations suggest that divorce decrees granted under the
Alaska statute should be accorded full faith and credit, and that domicile should not be held the sole jurisdictional basis for divorce. Alaska's
statute, unlike the Virgin Islands' statute in the Alton case and the
statutes in the "divorce mill" states," is not a commercially motivated
attempt to institutionalize "tourist divorces." The Alaska statute requires a minimum of at least one year's residence within the state, compared with as little as six weeks in some jurisdictions. The purpose of
the Alaska statute is not to infringe upon any interests which a domiciliary state might have in a serviceman's marital status; its purpose is
to provide a convenient forum in which servicemen stationed in Alaska
may seek divorces. The statute operates to correct a technical deficiency in the domicile rule which denies access to local divorce forums
to a limited group of persons whose need for such judicial process is as
great as that of any other group.
It seems unlikely that Alaska's exercise of divorce jurisdiction over
military personnel will in any way impair the marital stability of a
domiciliary state's society or the sanctions and policies behind its marriage laws. Changing views about the social utility of divorce and pressures generated by increased mobility of our population have negated
a great deal of the persuasiveness of the state interest argument. A
state's interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries who are in the
armed forces and stationed in other states is primarily an economic
interest. No state desires to bear the burden of supporting the families
of servicemen who are granted ex parte divorces which fail to provide
for adequate alimony and child support. However, this justification for
denial of full faith and credit assumes that Alaska will grant divorce
decrees to military personnel improvidently. The assumption does not
seem warranted. At any event, under the "divisible divorce" doctrine
an ex parte divorce decree does not effectively terminate the other
spouse's support rights."
Furthermore, the domiciliary state's interest in the marital status of
s3 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208 (1947)

(three months residence) ; IDAHO CODE § 32-

701 (1963) (six weeks residence) ; NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 125.020 (1963) (six weeks resi; WYo. Rav. STAT. § 20-48 (1959) (sixty days residence).
dence)
3
4 The Supreme Court has held that an ex parte migratory divorce decree cannot
affect the defendant spouse's right to support where that right has been previously
established by judicial decision. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). There are indications that even where the right to support is sought subsequent to the divorce it is not
affected by the divorce decree. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); for

state cases see EERENzwEiG, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 80, 81 (1962). In either case, the
law of the defendant spouse's state must provide for survival of the support right after
the decree is granted. See Comment, 76 Hanv. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
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military personnel who are stationed in Alaska for one year may be no
greater than, and usually is much less than, Alaska's interest. Divorce
jurisdiction conferred by the Alaska statute is based upon the substantial contacts with the state which a serviceman residing within Alaska
for one year will have established. In many cases the circumstances
which led to a divorce will have occurred or culminated in Alaska. It
seems unreasonable that military personnel should be denied a local
divorce forum in a state in which they have been stationed for at least
one year, while it is possible to gain a valid divorce decree in some states
after six weeks' residence and a pretense of establishing domicile.3"
In conclusion, divorce decrees granted under the Alaska statute
should be entitled to full faith and credit in all jurisdictions if both
parties have participated in the Alaska proceedings. The status of ex
parte divorces is not so certain, but if domicile is not a constitutional prerequisite for divorce, an ex parte decree under the Alaska
statute should be given full effect in other states. The domicile requirement, insofar as it applies to military personnel, represents what Mr.
Justice Cardozo has termed the "tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic";" it is hoped that this principle has also
reached the limits of its history and that it will not be applied to defeat
the desirable social policy embodied in the Alaska statute.

S Justice Clark, in reference to the Virgin Islands' statute which attempted to elimi-

nate domicile as a jurisdictional requirement, said that such a statute's "only vice ... is
that it makes unnecessary a choice between bigamy and perjury." Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith,
349 U.S. 1, 28 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
3
8 CAnDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICiAL PRocEss 51 (1928).

